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The ﬂow of time is experienced by humans although the exact nature of time is not well
understood. The importance of time in humans’ life is not in dispute and is reﬂected by
several dimensions like duration, which is best representing the naïve meaning of time.
Psychological time serves several important functions which are essential for being able to
act and survive in a dynamic environment. In the present paper we argue that psychological
time in the form of sensing the pace of the ﬂow of time provides important information to
the executive system which control and monitor behavior. When information processing
load is below an optimal level for a speciﬁc Individual a feeling of boredom is raised.
Boredom is accompanied by a slowing of the felt pace of the ﬂow of time. Boredom is a
unique mental state which is linked with decreasing efﬁciency in cognitive and perceptual
performance and is correlated with low job satisfaction and general well-being. As such,
boredom poses a threat to normal functioning.We suggest that the felt slowing in the ﬂow
of time is a signal which, similarly to pain, is aimed at alerting the executive system that
resources should be recruited in order to cope with the hazardous state.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL TIME
No understanding of human behavior can be complete with-
out referring to the notion of time. Indeed, humans can sense
the ﬂow of time, but the exact nature of the mechanism by
which this is done remains unclear. What humans (and maybe
animals) experience are temporal experiences, which are sub-
jective feelings that corresponds to physical time. Psychological
time is a product of the mind more than a reﬂection of natu-
ral chronometric order (Trautmann, 1995). It refers to temporal
dimensions such as duration, pace and the order of perceived
and internal events. Psychological time provides our informa-
tion processing system with important information that enables
us to represent the environment in our cognitive system and to act
accordingly.
PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE TIMING
The experience of time is termed prospective when it is related to
the duration of an ongoing interval and the observer is aware
of the need to judge that duration. When an observer is not
aware of the need to judge duration until the termination of
a target interval, the experience of time is a retrospective one
(Block, 1989). It is not clear if the subjective experiences asso-
ciated with prospective and retrospective duration judgments
are similar, but it is clear that the two types of temporal
experiences are based on different information processing pro-
cesses. Robust empirical ﬁndings as well as a comprehensive
meta-analysis (Block and Zakay, 1997; Zakay and Block, 2004)
indicate that different timing processes underlie the two judg-
ment types. Retrospective duration judgments can be accounted
for by the contextual change model (Block and Reed, 1978)
which suggests that when retrospective timing is needed, peo-
ple retrieve from memory contextual changes that were encoded
during a target interval. Retrospective duration judgment is a
function of the amount of retrieved contextual changes. The
more contextual changes are retrieved, the longer the duration
is judged to be. As a result, when information processing during
an interval is complex (i.e., remembering a complex geomet-
rical ﬁgure), the interval is judged to be longer in retrospect
than a respective interval in which information processing was
simple (i.e., remembering a simple geometrical ﬁgure like a cir-
cle). This is because complex information processing is causing
more contextual changes to be encoded than simple information
processing.
In contradistinction, prospective duration judgment is a func-
tion of the amount of attentional resources allocated for timing.
The more resources are allocated for timing the longer prospec-
tive duration judgment is (Brown, 1997). The result is a mirror
image of retrospective duration judgment. Prospective duration
judgments of same time periods are longer when non-temporal
information processing during a target interval is simple than
when it is complex. The reason is that the more demanding
non-temporal information processing is, the more attentional
resources are consumed by it, leaving fewer resources for timing
(Zakay, 1999).
ATTENTION AND PROSPECTIVE TIMING
At any given moment, attentional resources are divided between
all the concurrent tasks that need to be carried out simultane-
ously, including timing (Kahneman, 1973; Zakay, 1989). Zakay
and Block (1995) introduced the attentional gate model (AGM)
which is based on Church and Gibbon’s (Church, 1984) timing
model in animals. An attentional gate was added to the ani-
mal model. The gate is controlled by the amount of attentional
resources allocated for timing and determines the number of
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pulses emitted by a pacemaker that can pass through the gate
in a time unit. The pacemaker emits the pulses continuously
at a constant pace. The pulses are accumulated and counted
in a cognitive timer (Wearden, 2004). The more attentional
resources are allocated for timing, the more pulses are “allowed”
to pass through the gate. Thus, prospective duration judgment
is a function of the number of accumulated pulses in a given
time period (Zakay and Block, 1997). A similar attention-based
model, but with a different gating mechanism was introduced
by Lejeune (1998). In this model a dynamic switch is controlled
by the attentional resources allocated for timing. The switch is
opened and closed at a frequency determined by the amount of
attentional resources allocated for timing. With more attentional
resources, the higher the frequency and the larger the number
of pulses that can pass through, and be accumulated in the cog-
nitive counter (For a comparison between the two models see
Zakay, 2000).
The attentional gate as well as the dynamic-switch serves as
mechanisms for the regulation of attentional resources between
concurrent non-temporal tasks and timing. According to both
models when non-temporal tasks are simple and non-demanding
prospective timing of same clock time intervals will be longer
than when non-temporal tasks are complex and demanding.
Because of this state of affairs, prospective duration judgment
can serve as a measure of non-temporal information process-
ing load (Zakay and Schub, 1998). The reason for this is that
at any given moment attentional resources have to be divided
between all concurrent tasks that have to be performed, tempo-
ral or non-temporal, and because prospective duration judgment
is a function of the amount of attentional resources allocated
for timing, prospective duration judgment can be used as a
sensitive measure of concurrent non-temporal information pro-
cessing load. When the load is low, more attentional resources
can be allocated for prospective timing and duration estima-
tions become longer as compared with conditions with high
non-temporal information processing load. This was validated
in several studies (see Brown, 2008) as well as in a meta analytic
review (Block et al., 2010).
FUNCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TIME
As was already stated, temporal experiences are essential for
enabling humans to represent the temporal aspects of both the
external and internal environments, thus enabling adaptation
and survival. For example, being able to judge the duration
of an event is essential for knowing how to deal with similar
events in future encounters. However, we argue that tempo-
ral experiences provide the cognitive and meta-cognitive systems
with important information which enables optimal monitoring
of behavior. Monitoring of spoken communication is just one
example (Zakay et al., 2014). In the course of a conversation when
party A asks party B a question, a temporal expectation regarding
the response latency is evoked. This temporal expectation reﬂects
some kind of a norm. When actual response latency is signiﬁ-
cantly longer or shorter than the temporal expectation, party a
suspects that the response is not based on real knowledge and
therefore it can’t be trusted. This indicates that the duration of
the response latency is being monitored and timed prospectively.
The ongoing prospective duration judgment is compared with
the temporal expectation, a process which is well illustrated by
the AGM.
In this paper we focus on one speciﬁc function of psychological
time, namely, providing information about the concurrent level
of non-temporal information processing load. This function was
not yet elaborated in the literature.
THE NEED FOR INFORMATION AND FOR INFORMATION PROCESSING
LOAD
Humans need a certain amount of information in order to main-
tain a satisfactory level of adaptive behavior (Kuhltham, 1991).
Information is a product of variability in stimulation (Garner,
2014). Woodburn (1957) reports experiments on human behav-
ioral effects following prolonged exposure to a monotonous
environment. It was found that under such conditions thinking
was impaired, childish emotional responses appeared, visual per-
ception was disturbed, hallucinations developed and brain wave
patterns were altered. Similar ﬁndings were found in sensory
and perceptual deprivation experiments (Zubek andWelch, 1963;
Zakay and Lobel, 1983; Grassion, 1986). Similar effects are found
in real life situation which resemble perceptual deprivation like in
the case of snow-blindness which create a ganzfeld (Avant, 1965).
It can be concluded that the need for meaningful information is
a genuine need of the cognitive system which strives to gain the
optimal amount of information (Merhabian, 1977).
TEMPORAL EXPERIENCES AS INFORMATION
Michon (1972) introduced the idea of considering time as infor-
mation. He meant that temporal experiences provide information
about the succession of events. Like other perceptual dimen-
sions, psychological time provides our information processing
system with important information that enables the represen-
tation of the environment such that adaptive behavior becomes
possible.
We elaborate on this notion and propose that temporal infor-
mation informs the executive system which control and monitor
behavior about the ongoing state of the system’s performance
and functioning. It should be noted that information is more
than mere stimulation. This is demonstrated by studies of per-
ceptual deprivation (e.g., Grassion, 1986), in which the amount
of information is normal but it lacks variability. More research
is needed in order to understand the exact nature of tempo-
ral information. For example: How one feels the pace of time?
Are retrospective and prospective experiences providing the same
type of information or different types? Regardless of the need
for more research, the importance of temporal information is
clear.
Since any type of behavior takes a certain amount of time,
by monitoring the actual time a certain behavior endures and by
comparing it to temporal norms or expectations, it is possible to
monitor the regularity of behavior. We already gave the example
about monitoring the adequacy of spoken communication (e.g.,
Boltz, 2005). Another example is waiting behavior (Zakay et al.,
2009). When one is waiting for an event, and the event is delayed
in comparison to the expected waiting duration, a temporal expe-
rience of slowing of the pace of time accompanied by a general
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feeling of tension emerges (Osuna, 1985; Loftus et al., 1987). This
signals the system that something is wrong.
Here we focus on the fulﬁllment of the need for information
and for information processing.When this need is not satisﬁed the
system is in danger of not being able to perform optimally, as will
be illustrated in the next paragraphs. This state is manifested as an
emotion of boredom accompanied by a temporal experience felt
as the slowing of the pace of the ﬂow of time or boredom, which
signals the system that it is currently engaged with a suboptimal
level of non-temporal information processing.
BOREDOM
Boredom is deﬁned as a unique psychophysiological state pos-
sessing interrelated and inseparable emotional, motivational,
perceptual, and cognitive concomitants (O’Hanlon, 1981).
Boredom is a common emotion, which can appear as a
result of a speciﬁc situation or as a typical characteristic of an
individual. In the last case we speak about boredom prone-
ness (BP), which is a predisposition to experience boredom
(Farmer and Sundberg, 1986).
Boredom is an important issue in psychology, education and
work-life, and yet, it is not receiving the adequate attention
from researchers, as it deserves. The importance of boredom
stems from its links with well-being, psychopathologies, job-
satisfaction and other important aspects of human behavior
(Smith, 1981).
Situational boredom is experiencedwhen one ﬁnds him/herself
in a situation in which most of one’s attentional resources are
free and are not allocated to a speciﬁc task which demands infor-
mation processing. This might be the result of a monotonous
environment which lacks stimulation and variance, or from hav-
ing to perform a routine, non-challenging task or having to
listen to a redundant lecture which does not provide any new
information and is read in a monotonous voice. The differ-
ence between boredom and situations like leisure or play is that
whereas in the latter one is absorbed in the activity and a sense
of time disappears, in boredom one wishes to quit the situa-
tion and the sense of time is augmented (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).
People characterized as having high BP tend to experience bore-
dom even in situations in which the level of stimulation and
required information processing load are normal (Csikszentmi-
halyi, 2000).
Boredom is maintained by an environment that is perceived
as static, with the actor remaining largely disconnected from the
processes that comprise the environment (Farmer and Sundberg,
1986). Boredom can be induced experimentally by exposing par-
ticipants to sensory or perceptual deprivation conditions for long
periods (Zakay and Lobel, 1983; Grassion, 1986). In reality, bore-
dom and monotony at work were found to be associated (Drory,
1982).
Boredom and BP are negatively correlated with need for cog-
nition, which indicates a lower level of cognitive motivation than
that of other people (Cacioppo et al., 1996). Watt and Blanchard
(1994) found that individuals, who were less likely to engage
in an enjoyable effortful cognitive activity, were more prone to
experience negative affects of boredom when compared to high
need-for-cognition persons.
BOREDOM AND MALADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR
Boredom and BP were found to be linked with maladaptive
behavior in several domains.
Whereas boredom was not found to be signiﬁcantly related to
levels of intelligence and education (Hill, 1975), it is recognized
as a widespread and signiﬁcant problem. Boredom and lack of
curiosity were reported to be the most common cause of drug use
(Samuels and Samuels, 1974), and has been associated with eating
disorders for both obese and non-obese persons (Abramson and
Stinson, 1977).
Bored students were rated more often as maladjusted by teach-
ers in comparison to other students (Fogelman, 1976). In work-
life, job dissatisfaction and diminished performance efﬁciency,
tend to be highly correlated with boredom and BP (O’Hanlon,
1981). BP was found to be a predictor of aggressive and risky
driving (Dahlen et al., 2005).
Evidences of an inverse relationship between the ability
to cope adaptively with boredom and psychopathology were
reported by Hamilton et al. (1984). High boredom- copers
reported better well-being and greater compliance with orga-
nizational safety rules, compared with low boredom- copers
(Annilee, 2007).
Positive correlations between boredom and BP and between
level of hopelessness in a hopelessness scale and negative correla-
tions with personal life satisfaction across many dimensions were
reported (Neugarten et al., 1961).
BOREDOM, BP, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TIME
Based on the former review of prospective timing and attentional
model like the AGM, the state of boredom can be deﬁned as a
mental state characterized by low level of non-temporal informa-
tion processing load. The negative emotion which accompanies
boredom leads one to wish for the ending of the situation, and
therefore, like in waiting, most of a person’s available attentional
resources are allocated for prospective timing. The result is a
feeling of duration lengthening or slowing of the pace of the
ﬂow of time (Zakay, 2012). Note, that even if the feeling of the
ﬂow of time might be considered a perceptual illusion (Gruber
and Block, 2013; Block and Gruber, 2014), it is still a source of
information. This is similar to perceptual illusions like apparent
motion or the phi phenomenon which provide signiﬁcant infor-
mation, albeit an illusionary one. Not much research has tested
the relation between perceived duration and boredom. In one
of the BP scales (Farmer and Sundberg, 1986) three items out
of 28 relate to time. Watt (1991) found that highly boredom-
prone individuals perceived time as passing more slowly dur-
ing a boring task than low boredom-prone persons, but the two
groups did not differ in their objective or chronometric time-
passage estimates. Similarly, Wittman and Paulus (2008) report
that high boredom-prone individuals perceive a slowing of the
pace of time and overestimated durations in time-estimation
tasks, when a reproduction method was used. (Note that if a
production method is used durations will be underestimated,
respectively).
It is of interest to note that the other pole of boredom, termed
“ﬂow,” is a state of peak enjoyment, energetic focus and cre-
ative concentration experienced by people engaged in adult play
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which has become the basis of a highly creative approach to
living (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 2000). From Psychological time
perspective, whereas boredom produce a signiﬁcant increase in
duration judgment, ﬂow is a state in which attentional resources
are almost fully allocated for non-temporal information process-
ing and as a result duration judgment is minimized (Time ﬂies
by when you are having fun; see Zakay, 2012. For more inter-
pretations of this phenomenon see Gable and Poole, 2012, or
Sackett et al., 2010).
CONCLUSION
Psychological time fulﬁlls several vital functions like in the plan-
ning and performing of psychomotor activities and movements
(Flanagan andWing, 1997) and in meta-cognition, like in human
monitoring of human communication (Zakay et al., 2014). In
the present paper we elaborate the notion that psychological
time should be considered as information. We further dwell
into this consideration and suggest that temporal information
is essential in alerting the executive system which control and
monitor behavior that the overall level of information pro-
cessing load is lower than the optimal level required for an
adequate functioning of the system. This is manifested by a
unique state and emotion called boredom. We reviewed stud-
ies showing that boredom and BP are linked with lowering
cognitive and perceptual performance, with the use of drugs,
with lowering job satisfaction and educational achievements, in
reducing the amount of effort one can invest in performing
tasks and in low level of need for cognition, and with lowering
the level of general well-being. The practical consequences of
boredom include diminished performance efﬁciency and health
(O’Hanlon, 1981; Annilee, 2007). This is obviously a hazardous
state that is not desired from an evolutionary perspective. Peo-
ple usually wish to ﬁnd themselves in a mental state of “Flow,”
which is the opposite pole of boredom, deﬁned as a state of
peak enjoyment, energetic focus, and creative concentration
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Indeed, Wilson et al. (2014) found that
people preferred to administer electric shock to themselves instead
of doing nothing.
In a state of boredom the felt pace of the ﬂow of time is slowed
down. This can be explained by attentional models of prospective
timing like the AGM (Zakay and Block, 1995). Prospective dura-
tion judgment is sensitive to the division of attentional resources
between concurrent temporal and non-temporal tasks because it is
a function of amount of attentional resources left for timing after
the required amount was allocated for concurrent non-temporal
tasks. From this perspective, we suggest that the alerting function
of psychological time is similar to that of pain. Pain is an unpleas-
ant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or
potential tissue damage. Ecclest and Crombey (1999), suggest
that pain is salient in naturally complex environments because
the selection of pain interrupts attention, rupture behavior and
imposes priority on escape actions. The interruptive function
of pain is that pain is selected for action from within complex
affective and motivational environments to urge escape. In both
cases of boredom and pain, the system is required to change
the division of attentional resources in order to cope with the
situation.
The alerting function of psychological time is based on a com-
parison between ongoing prospective temporal judgments and
temporal norms and expectations.We suggest that each individual
is characterized by an idiosyncratic level of information process-
ing (Merhabian, 1977), required for optimal behavior. When this
level is achieved, it is accompanied by a certain felt pace of time.
The ongoing felt pace of time is continuously compared with the
norm and a state of a too slow pace gives rise to a feeling of
boredom.
Further research is needed in order to validate the function of
psychological time which was introduced here. A better under-
standing of the link between boredom, temporal experiences, and
information processing might lead to a more complete compre-
hension of the functions of psychological time on the one hand,
and to contribute to the development of effective methods for
dealing with the state of boredom and with boredom-proneness.
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